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abStract. Despite different perceptions, discourses and approaches, the post-Cold War 
Arctic is with a high geopolitical stability based on institutional, international cooperation 
started by the Arctic states and supported by Arctic indigenous peoples, non-
governmental organizations and sub-national governments. As a result, there are neither 
armed conflicts nor serious disputes on national borders. Behind the high geopolitical 
stability are on the one hand, common interests of the Arctic states to decrease military 
tension and increase political stability by causing a transformation from confrontation 
to environmental cooperation. On the other hand, there are certain features of Arctic 
geopolitics as prerequisites for a transformation, such as firm state sovereignty, high 
degree of legal certainty, and flexibility in agenda setting. When assessing a state of Arctic 
geopolitics and IR of the post-Cold War era, there is an ambivalence on how ‘geopolitics’ 
is defined. Behind are the dualism of military presence based on the nuclear weapons’ 
systems and the high stability based on international, institutional cooperation between 
the eight Arctic states. As well as, that there are two major competing discourses: first, 
the Arctic as a ’zone of peace’ and exceptional in world politics, and second, that there 
is a race of resources and the consequent emerging conflicts in the Arctic. In addition, 
there are fresh reminders that Arctic geopolitics is impacted by (grand) environmental 
challenges and ‘wicked problems’, in particular climate change; and that new multi-
dimensional dynamics has made Arctic geopolitics global. The article aims to draw up a 
holistic picture of the post-Cold War Arctic, and discuss what might be special features of 
Arctic geopolitics in globalization. The article examines and discusses the transformation 
of approach from classical geopolitics to critical geopolitics by applying main approaches 
of geopolitics to the Arctic/Arctic geopolitics.
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introduction
The ultimate aim, or ‘arts’, of ‘Politics’ is said 
to make possible to happen. This requires 
contest and (political) fight, which is done 
through, and by, a speech act and rhetoric. 
They, as well as texts, construct geopolitics, 
too (Moisio 2003). For example, the phrase 
to call the Arctic as a “zone of peace” by 
President Mikhail Gorbachev (1987) has 
influenced the reality and Arctic geopolitics. 
There are also other visions or perceptions 
concerning of the Arctic region, such as 
“Homeland”, “Land of discovery”, “Storehouse 
of resources”, “Theater for military”, 
“Environmental linchpin”, “Scientific Arctic” 
by the Arctic Human Development Report 
(AHDR 2004). Correspondingly, among the 
imaginaries, or external and internal images, 
to cross borders are “Terra nullius”, “Frozen 
ocean”, “Indigenous statehood”, “Resource 
frontier”, “Nature reserve” by Contesting 
the Arctic (Steinberg et al. 2015). Finally, 
statements like “What happens in the 
Arctic, doesn’t stay there!”, indicate, even 
manifest, that the Arctic is been globalized 
(Heininen and Finger, 2017), and the global 
Arctic has become a barometer for global 
environmental and climate change. 
As an analysis of different perceptions, the 
Arctic Human Development Report 2004 
(Heininen 2004) recognized and defined 
the following as the main themes/trends 
of the early-21st century’s Arctic geopolitics 
and IR: increasing circumpolar cooperation 
by indigenous peoples and sub-national 
governments; region-building with states 
as major actors; and a new kind of relations 
between the Arctic and rest of world. They 
are still relevant, though the context is been 
slightly changed, in particular the last one 
has become more important and strategic. 
Popular geopolitics is more than written 
text. This is seen, when media does not 
only report about the Arctic but also 
influence how big audience is reading and 
interpreting Arctic geopolitics. For example, 
when a Russian long-range strategic bomber 
(Tupolev 95 “Bear”) is seen flying pass (in 
international air space), or a military exercise 
is happening - though the question is about 
routine patrolling and activities by armies 
-, the slogan or headline that “geopolitics 
is back!” may occur. Or, that in the Arctic 
there is a ‘race’ for resources and consequent 
emerging conflicts, as “The Battle for the 
North Pole” (Traufetter, 2008) media headline 
indicates. The interpretation of a return of 
geopolitics, particularly after the Russian 
expedition to the bottom of the North Pole in 
2007, is not only media headlines, wretched 
slogans or misleading rhetoric. It was/is 
along to the mainstream interpretation of 
geopolitics, as well as that of new realism of 
IR as a traditional understanding of politics, 
which for example directed the European 
Union’s attention to the Arctic (Raspotnik, 
2016). Unlike, indigenous peoples’ issues, in 
particular raised by their organizations, such 
as identities, land use, self-determination, 
or knowledge-creation and the interplay 
between science and politics as responses 
to security challenges of climate change, 
are mostly been interpreted to deal with 
‘governance’, not geopolitics. Although 
dealing with values and aims, and bringing 
in other actors, they are along to critical 
approach of geopolitics. 
Behind is that at the early-21st Arctic 
geopolitics and international century 
relations (IR) have been influenced by two 
major discourses (Heininen, 2010): The 
dominating discourse says that the Arctic 
of the early-21st century is with a high 
geopolitical stability based on established 
intergovernmental cooperation, the Arctic 
as a ’zone of peace’ (Heininen 2016; Zagorski 
2017; Byers 2017; NGP Yearbook 2011, 2012). 
As a counter-argument, there is another 
discourse saying that a race of resources 
and the consequent emerging conflicts, 
or even a new ‘cold war’, has started in 
the Arctic (Borgerson 2008; Traufetter 
2008). Further, that the Arctic is like any 
other region of the world, and therefore 
it cannot be isolated from international 
politics (Käpylä and Mikkola 2015). In the 
literature of Arctic geopolitics & IR there 
are several contributions concentrating 
on the one hand, on different images and 
perceptions of the Arctic, Arctic governance, 
Arctic & Northern indigenous peoples and 
identities (Raspotnik 2016; Steinberg et al. 
eds. 2015; Powell and Dodds eds. 2014), and 
on the other hand, on (state) sovereignty, 
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international law and treaties, national 
policies, institutional points of view and 
international institutions, such as the Arctic 
Council (Murray and Nuttall eds. 2014; 
Yearbook of Polar Law 2013; Heininen 2011).
In addition, there are a few fresh reminders: 
First, that ‘the environment matters’, i.e. Arctic 
geopolitics, as well as security, is impacted 
by (grand) environmental challenges, 
in particular long-range pollution (e.g. 
nuclear wastes) and rapid climate change 
(Hoogensen Gjörv et al. eds. 2013). Second, 
that globalization and its new geo-physical 
and socio-economic dynamics affect the 
Arctic region, and followed from that the 
new multi-dimensional dynamics has made 
Arctic geopolitics global (Keil and Knecht eds. 
2017; Heininen and Southcott, eds. 2010), 
and the globalized Arctic has worldwide 
implications to the Earth (System) (Heininen 
and Finger 2017). 
The aim of this article is to draw up a holistic 
picture of the post-Cold War Arctic, and 
discuss what might be special features of 
Arctic geopolitics in globalization. The article 
examines and discusses the transformation of 
approach from classical geopolitics to critical 
geopolitics by applying main approaches of 
geopolitics to the Arctic/Arctic geopolitics. 
Before applying geopolitics to the post-Cold 
War Arctic, I will examine and discuss the 
main schools of thought of geopolitics and 
their factors, in particular the approach shift 
from classical to critical geopolitics. 
materialS and methodS
When assessing a state of Arctic geopolitics 
and IR of the post-Cold War era, there 
is an ambivalence on how ‘geopolitics’ 
is defined, and what approach to use. 
Behind is the dualism of on the one hand, 
military presence based on the nuclear 
weapons’ systems of the two superpowers 
– this is according to classical geopolitics 
and emphasizing physical space, power, 
technology and a state -, and on the other 
hand, high geopolitical stability based on 
international, institutional cooperation 
between, and concern on state of the 
environment by, the eight Arctic states – this 
indicates critical approach of geopolitics 
and emphasizes an importance of other 
factors, such as quality of the environment, 
knowledge, and that there are several actors. 
The both parts of the dualism are correct, 
and thus, facts. Therefore, it is needed to ask: 
Does the current Arctic geopolitics go along 
to the mainstream understanding (classical) 
of geopolitics, or along to critical approach 
based on the transformation from classical 
to critical geopolitics? Or, is the current state 
(of Arctic geopolitics) some sort of hybrid, 
which includes aspects from the both 
approach? 
To answer to these questions I apply the main 
schools of thought of geopolitics – classical, 
new and critical -, and their factors, to the 
Arctic and Arctic geopolitics of the post-
Cold War period. Here factors (of geopolitics) 
play important role, as well as who are the 
actors, in particular important are values and 
aims of actors, their relations with theories 
and facts, and in particular how to change 
the facts to reach the values and aims. Final, 
I define and discuss common interests 
between the Arctic states, as well as special 
features of Arctic geopolitics, which made 
possible the transformation of the post-Cold 
War geopolitics from confrontation to high 
stability.
The used method here is critical approach 
of geopolitics. It is analytical and goes 
beyond classical geopolitics and traditional 
or positivist interpretation of international 
politics by drawing up a holistic picture on 
the issue area and having an unorthodox 
approach of IR. The critical approach, as 
critical social science in general, aims to take 
into consideration, in addition of general 
criteria of science (including criticism), 
values and aims/goals, and their relations 
with theories and facts, the interrelations 
between theories, facts, values and aims/
goals, and final, how to change the facts 
to reach the values and aims/goals (Harle 
2003). This is much according to the original 
idea of ‘politics’ to make possible to happen. 
If you value peace, and aim to have a peaceful 
situation, you choose theories, methods and 
means accordingly. Therefore, you cannot 
lean alone on factors, such as physical space, 
natural resources and power/force, which 
are determined with aims/goals like natural 
laws. You also need actors, in whose interest 
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peace is, people(s), civil society and other 
non-state and non-(security)political elitist 
actors. Behind is philosophy that to maintain 
peace is never passive and needs actors 
with interests, including values and aims to 
change facts to reach the values. 
reSultS
Despite different perceptions, discourses 
and approaches, the post-Cold War Arctic 
is with a high geopolitical stability based on 
institutional, international cooperation started 
by the Arctic states and supported by Arctic 
non-state actors, such as Arctic indigenous 
peoples, non-governmental organizations 
and sub-national governments. As a result, 
there are neither armed conflicts nor serious 
disputes on national borders. Instead, there is 
functional cooperation on several fields, and a 
dialogue between the Arctic states and other 
local actors, and between Arctic actors and 
those from outside of the region. The high 
stability, as well as cooperation, is firmly stated, 
even demonstrated, by the eight Arctic states 
with the first preamble of the joint ministerial 
meeting declarations of the Arctic Council: 
“Reaffirming the commitment to maintain 
peace, stability and constructive cooperation 
in the Arctic.” (e.g., Iqaluit Declaration 2015; 
Fairbanks Declaration  2017), as well as by the 
five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean (Ilulissat 
Declaration 2008). The stability seems to have 
a solid foundation and be resilient, since it 
has been managed to maintain in spite of 
recent turbulent times in international politics 
and uncommon instabilities in world politics, 
and it has already passed, for far, a few tests 
(Clifford 2017; Heininen 2016; Heininen et al. 
2014).
Behind the high geopolitical stability are 
on the one hand, common interests of the 
Arctic states to decrease military tension 
and increase political stability by causing a 
transformation from the confrontation of the 
Cold War period to functional environmental 
cooperation, and on the other hand, certain 
features of Arctic geopolitics as prerequisites 
for a transformation. Though there is a 
need for further research (Heininen forth-
coming), among already known, discussed 
and analyzed common interests between 
the Arctic states are): First, to decrease 
military tension and increase political stability 
between the former rivals, as the ultimate 
aim for confidence-building. Second, to start 
transboundary and functional (expert and 
scientific) cooperation for environmental 
protection and assessment, which could 
be expanded onto other fields. Third, to 
allow modern region-building with states 
as major actors, such as the establishment 
of the Arctic Council. Fourth, to support 
and encourage circumpolar inter-regional 
cooperation between Arctic indigenous 
peoples, sub-national governments and other 
non-state (local and regional) actors, which 
will correspondingly support environmental 
protection and region-building lead by states; 
Fifth, based on the history of exploration 
to maintain and enhance the Arctic as a 
‘laboratory’/‘workshop’ of international 
scientific research (Toyama Statement 2016), 
including to allow the scientific community 
to reach higher position of influence “within 
the Arctic Council’s subgovernmental 
policymaking environment than at the 
domestic level” (Forbis and Hayhoe 2018). 
Final, to enhance and develop sustainable and 
long-term business relations and economic 
development in the Arctic, much prioritized 
by the Arctic states’ national policies and 
strategies and according to the mission of the 
Arctic Economic Council.
These common interests and high stability 
would not be there in the post-Cold War 
Arctic without a joint understanding within 
the Arctic states of the value and importance 
of the high stability, and that the stability built 
on confidence (which is correspondingly 
based on cooperation) would be beneficial for 
all the parties (Heininen 2016; Byers 2017). This 
understanding, or ‘Arctic consensus’ (Zagorski 
2017), is there even to that extend that there is 
rational thinking within the Arctic states how 
much each of them would lose, if anyone of 
them would damage the cooperation. Behind 
is ‘spillover’, the main idea of the process of 
functional cooperation that as states “become 
more embedded in an integration process, 
the benefits of cooperation and the costs 
of withdrawing from cooperative ventures 
increase.” (Lamy et al. 2013). The short history 
of the post-Cold War Arctic supports this 
assertion by the theory of functionalism. 
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Correspondingly, before this cooperation 
started in the Arctic region there were a few 
features of Arctic geopolitics, as well as those 
of Arctic security, which can be interpreted 
to be preconditions for the current state 
of high geopolitical stability. They made 
functional cooperation (for environmental 
protection) possible and promoted the 
manmade trans-boundary cooperation, and 
thus also made the transformation possible 
in the first place. Later they put the Arctic 
states’ governments carefully to consider 
the risk and costs if they would lose the high 
stability. Thus, they created opportunities 
for the Arctic states to recognize common 
interests and understand the benefits of 
them, and at the same time these features 
were strengthened. Among the features as 
preconditions for international cooperation 
and high geopolitical are: First, global nuclear 
deterrence of the two superpowers - the 
Soviet Union and the USA – as the original 
nature of the military and a legacy of the 
Cold War period. Second, that in the Arctic 
there were/are neither (armed) conflicts 
nor serious disputes on state sovereignty or 
disagreements of national borders between 
the Arctic states. Third, instead there was/is a 
high degree of international legal certainty in 
the Arctic, in particular meaning the UNCLOS 
and the legally-binding agreements under 
the auspices of the Arctic Council. Fourth, 
there were devolution and other soft ways 
of (the Nordic model of ) governance, which 
were renewed and promoted by innovative 
legal and political arrangements (The Arctic 
Yearbook 2017; AHDR 2004). Final, the Arctic 
states have separated issue areas by leaving 
issues of ‘high’ politics out of the joint agenda 
of the Arctic Council (also Byers 2017), in 
particular that “the Arctic Council should not 
deal with matters related to military security” 
(a well-known foot-note in the Ottawa 
Declaration 1996). As a result, the agenda 
setting in the post-Cold War Arctic is flexible. 
Following the common interests and the 
geopolitical features as prerequisites, it 
is possible – as well as there is a need for 
further research (Heininen forth-coming) - 
to recognize several special features of the 
post-post Cold War Arctic as potential new 
themes of Arctic geopolitics of the 2010s. The 
first special feature is that Arctic geopolitics 
(consisting of traditional and new several 
factors of geopolitics), as well as Arctic 
security (including aspects of traditional, 
environmental and human security), are 
tightly connected with the environment. 
Following from this, geopolitics and 
security in the Arctic context are combined 
with each other, as the second feature. 
The third feature of Arctic geopolitics is 
‘exceptionalism’, i.e. the high geopolitical 
stability of the post-Cold War Arctic based 
on the institutional cooperation between 
the Arctic states, and supported by the 
Arctic Council observer countries, makes the 
Arctic region exceptional in world politics 
and IR. Finally, the Arctic is globalized, 
and thus, the globalized Arctic can be 
interpreted as a new geopolitical context, 
which can be interpreted as a potential asset 
to reformulate a state of world politics with 
‘uncommon instability’ (Heininen 2016). 
diScuSSion 
from classical to critical geopolitics 
Geopolitics is one of the so-called grand 
theories used in several disciplines, such 
as (Political) Geography, Strategic studies 
and IR. It deals with ‘Geography’, ‘Politics’ 
and ‘Technology’ with an emphasis on the 
interrelationships between them. ‘Classical 
geopolitics’, the original school of thoughts 
on geopolitics, as well as its sub-theories, is 
traditionally interpreted to deal with ‘physical 
space’, including natural resources, ‘power’ 
and a ‘state’. In the focus, are the strategic 
value and control of a physical space, and 
the power and hegemony connected with a 
state (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990). Here 
a ‘state’ refers to the institution of a nation / 
unified state as a political and administrative 
entity, or ‘polity’, as well as the unified state 
system. ‘Power’ means both ‘might’ of, and 
brute force by, a state, which is, if needed, 
guaranteed by “unilateral, national(istic), 
competitive, military power” (Newcombe 
1986). In addition, ‘technology’ plays a 
relevant role here, as the technology models 
of geopolitics did in the Cold War Arctic 
emphasizing the importance of advanced 
(arms) technology (e.g., airplane, missile and 
submarine) (Heininen 1991).
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Among implementations are the above-
mentioned technology models, which 
emphasize the strategic importance, even 
determination of technology. They are 
interpreted to be the ultimate precondition – 
if advanced military technology allowed it to 
happen, it happened - for the militarization 
of the Arctic in the 2nd World War and the 
Cold War (Heininen 1991). The resources 
models emphasize the strategic importance 
of natural resources and potential race and 
emerging conflicts related to their utilization 
(Dalby 2002), as the other discourse of Arctic 
geopolitics states. Final, the so-called “Great 
Game” vision emphasizes the geostrategic 
importance of Central Asia very high and 
followed from this, even as determined, 
there was the hegemony competition of the 
major powers in the 19th and 20th centuries 
and partly still at the early-21st century. 
These models/visions, as well as geopolitics 
in general, have largely been applied, as well 
as misused, in politics within the last hundred 
years. For example, the Nazi Germany 
used geopolitics, in particular geopolitical 
thinking interpreted by Friedrich Ratzel 
and Karl Haushofer, for its power politics 
and as an excuse to occupy new territories 
and resources, ‘Lebensraum’ (Dougherty 
and Pfaltzgraff 1990). This much ruined the 
reputation of geopolitics for decades, and 
was the reason why geopolitics became 
almost a taboo in science after the 2nd 
World War. Research on geopolitics was 
not, however, totally forgotten in the Cold 
War period, but applied in security and 
strategic studies, in particular dealing with 
the maritime strategies of the Soviet Union 
and the USA in the High North and Arctic 
waters (e.g. Posen 1987; Miller 1986), as well 
as arms control and disarmament in the 
Arctic (Heininen 1991). It was also applied 
in environmental studies by broadening 
the scope, for example with an ecological 
perspective (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 
1990). The environment was interpreted to 
be a geopolitical treat, when states collapse 
as a result of the explosion of demographic 
and environmental forces, that the 
degradation of natural environment causes 
migration, growth of urban areas, and the 
consequent disintegration and ethnic 
conflicts (Kaplan 2002). 
Among major (sub)theories of classical 
geopolitics are the Heartland theory, the 
Seapower theory and that of Rimland: 
According to the Heartland theory of 
Mackinder (e.g. 1904), Russia can be 
interpreted, or even determined, to control 
the world, since it controls East Europe and 
the landmass of Eurasia (the ‘Heartland’). It 
is good to remember that at the time the 
Arctic Ocean was totally ice-covered and 
thus, made the huge landmass of Eurasia 
even bigger. Mahan’s Seapower theory (e.g. 
Mahan 1918) much challenges the Heartland 
theory and states that who controls, at least, 
two of the world oceans and has open 
access into two oceans, controls the world, 
as did the British Empire and the USA later 
(interestingly, the Arctic Ocean was neither 
taken into consideration nor defined as an 
ocean at the time). Not surprisingly, the 
USA still much emphasizes the freedom of 
seas, which is one of the reasons for the USA 
not to ratify the UNCLOS. Correspondingly, 
Spykman criticized Mackinder’s Heartland 
theory for overestimating the potential of 
the Heartland’s land mass (Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff 1990), and his Rimland theory 
(Spykman 1944) emphasizes the strategic 
importance of the ‘Inner Crescent’, i.e. the 
rimland between the heartland and the 
oceans from the Mediterranian to China. 
Spykman’s theory was a foundation for 
George Kennan’s ‘policy of containment’ of 
the Soviet Union, but it has not been applied 
to the Arctic region consisting of an ocean 
and two rimlands.
Based on these major theories geopolitics 
is much to study the spatialization of 
international politics by major powers and 
hegemonic states, which understands 
geopolitics to be concerned “the geography 
of international politics”, especially 
the relationship between the physical 
environment and the conduct of foreign 
policy (Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). Due to 
the narrow thinking of classical approach, 
importance of real issues and challenges, 
such as the environment, people(s) and 
climate change, were underestimated or 
neglected. This much sounds like power 
politics, or what is understood as ‘Realpolitik’, 
a traditional understanding of international 
politics and practice of diplomacy “based 
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on the assessment of power, territory, and 
material interests, with little concern on 
ethical realities” (Lamy et al. 2013).  
Classical geopolitics was challenges in the 
1990s by new and critical approaches that 
re-conceptualized the traditional definitions 
and interpretations. In the background was 
on the one hand, that classical geopolitics 
interpreted geopolitics as a determined 
dogma. Geopolitics and its traditional 
interpretations were not deeply analyzed but 
more copied from natural sciences, as a state 
“was seen as a living organism that occupies 
and that grows, contracts, and eventually 
dies”, or at least as an aggregate-organism 
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990). For 
example, not to consider the Arctic Ocean 
as an ocean, but only determined by sea ice, 
does not take into consideration changes in 
a nature, i.e. climate change, and that those 
changes, when they are rapid, have societal 
impacts and influence politics and policy-
making. On the other hand, there was a shift 
in mindset and cultures due to globalization, 
as well as change in security premises due to 
pollution and the consequent environmental 
awakening, and their impacts to policy-
shaping and policy-making.
Behind were also indicators of a transition 
into other kinds of more globalized systems, 
such as economic integration making 
‘geoeconomics’ strategic, regional or city 
states as new influential actors (with different 
interests as nation states), and later the 
social and economic systems based on the 
digital world developed with the internet 
(here the internet as a virtual reality can be 
seen as an emerging geopolitical space 
(Vuori, 2017)). These approaches made 
geopolitics a discursive practice by which 
to represent international politics as a ‘world’ 
characterized by particular types of places, 
peoples and dramas (Tuathail and Agnew, 
1992). Geopolitics was (re)defined as human 
action not determined, since people give 
the meaning for ‘geo’ in social and political 
activities, they are actors, not ‘geo’ per se. 
Following from this, geopolitics could also 
be defined as a contest or fight, where the 
relation between geopolitical discourse and 
geopolitical rhetoric is important (Moisio, 
2003). 
All in all, redefinition of geopolitics occupied 
more room with new discourses, and ’new’ 
and ‘critical’ schools of thought of geopolitics 
were established. It was the 1990s, when 
geopolitics had some sort of renaissance in 
research. For example, ‘new geopolitics’ as a 
school of thoughts is keenly related with the 
growing importance of ‘Economics’ per se, 
and economic integration, when after the 
end of the Cold War period economics took 
over geopolitics (Ohmae, 1995). Economic 
integration became more important in 
international politics and foreign policy, 
when  national economies were not any 
more strictly regulated by states, influenced 
by new theories of economics, such as ‘New 
liberalism’, but opened for international 
markets run by trans-national financial and 
other companies. 
The importance of geoeconomics could 
also be seen in the 1990s among the 
Arctic states, when after the end of the 
Cold War the Nordic countries, first joined 
the European Economic Area (EEA) in 
1994, and in 1995 Finland and Sweden 
joined the ECs / EU (Denmark had joined 
in 1973). As well as, when Canada and the 
USA, together with Mexico, established the 
North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in 
1996. Or, when the Arctic states showed 
more interest towards economic activities 
in the Arctic by establishing joint ventures 
between Western and Russian companies 
dealing with exploitation of hydrocarbons 
in the Russian Arctic, and thus going 
beyond the geopolitical barriers of 
the Cold War. For example, there were 
several negotiations between Russian 
companies (e.g. Gazprom, Rosneft) and 
Western companies (e.g. Norsk Hydro, 
Conoco Inc., Total S.A., Neste Oy) about 
joint exploitation of oil and gas drilling 
ventures. The best known of them the 
Shtokman gas field “became a flagship 
name for Russian oil and gas development 
in offshore Arctic conditions. ” This flagship 
status was related to the desire of the state 
to find new sources of economic stability...” 
(Goes, 2018). So, when internationally the 
Shtokman case was seen from the point 
of view of geoeconomics and a part of 
new liberalism, nationally in Russia it, was 
seen as a strategic resource base which 
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provides the means for the socio-economic 
development of the country. 
       
These new discourses and approaches 
challenged, as well as problematized, the 
traditional approaches of geopolitics by 
having a general understanding that, in 
addition of physical space, technology and 
state power, there exit other factors, which 
deal with values, aims/goals and other 
immaterial things, as well as interrelations 
between different factors. Among them are 
‘social space’, ‘identity/ies’ and ‘knowledge’, 
which come together with people(s), 
indicating that there are other actors as a 
state (Moisio 2003; Jukarainen 1999). As well 
as ‘cooperation’ and ‘peace’ as means how to 
change the existing facts and reach your aims. 
As a result, in addition of more traditional 
factors, new (immaterial and soft) factors, 
as well as new actors, were also recognized 
relevant to geopolitics, and that they - i.e. 
values and aims, their relations with theories 
and facts and their interrelations - should be 
taken into consideration, in particular how to 
change the facts to reach the values and aims.
recent changes of arctic geopolitics
Based on classical approach of geopolitics 
(e.g., the technology and resources models, 
etc..) and its major factors (e.g., physical 
space, power connected with a state) for 
the Arctic states – either the eight Arctic 
states (A8), or the five littoral states of the 
Arctic Ocean (A5) – sovereignty, power over 
resources and resource governance, and 
economic interests are still important. They 
do, however, also take into consideration 
fundamental changes in the Arctic and 
Arctic geopolitics due to globalization and 
global impacts, such as climate change, 
within the Arctic region. Indeed, climate 
change, and long-range pollution earlier, 
have clearly shown, even manifested, the 
strategic importance of the environment, 
and that it has become an important 
(new) geopolitical factor as a value with 
aims to change it (either via mitigation or 
adaptation) (Heininen 2013). One of the 
weaknesses of the traditional approach 
of geopolitics is a lack to recognize the 
environment as a value, and that quality 
Table 1. Differences between ’classical’ and ’critical’ Geopolitics and Their factors
’classical’ geopolitics: ’critical’ geopolitics: 
Traditional and narrow interpretation of 
‘Geo’ + ‘Politics’; 
Reflects exploration, state sovereignty, 
hegemony and force;
Factors: physical space + natural resources 
technology, power/force by the state (e.g. 
the Resource models and Technology 
models) 
Critical how power transformation happens: 
12 times of 16 a war has occurred when a 
rising power defeat (Allison, 2017).
Goes beyond ’Realpolitik’ and challenges 
mainstream thinking;
Reflects sophisticated power and 
recognizes knowledge as power;
Factors: in addition those of classical 
geopolitics identity/ies, images, knowledge, 
‘politicization’ of physical space (the 
environment), and in addition of the state 
several actors (including people(s) and civil 
society).
From classical geopolitics to critical 
geopolitics indicates and reflects the 
movement from determined, disciplinary 
theories towards different discourses and 
interpretations (‘politicization’ of physical 
space), from power politics to knowledge 
(wicked problems), from centralized to 
subsidiarity (devolution), from national 
to local and global (globalism), and from 
material to immaterial (digitalization).
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(of the environment) matters, in addition 
of interpreting the environment only as 
physical space with natural resources. The 
irony here is that geopolitics is defined as 
one of the major environmental theories 
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990).  
   
Unlike, critical geopolitics recognizes new 
factors, such as identities, knowledge, 
stability, as well as takes into consideration 
other actors, indigenous and other peoples, 
civil societies and sub-national governments, 
as well as their interests, are in focus. Based 
on that it is needed to have a more holistic 
and multi-dimensional approach and solid 
description of the twenty-first century’s 
globalized Arctic region. Further, the multi-
dimensional and multi-functional nature of 
Arctic geopolitics includes, for example, that 
there are more sophisticated factors and 
several actors with their identities have taken 
into consideration. Further, that identity 
matters and much deals with livelihoods, 
and that pollution impacts heavily and 
kills thousands, and that climate change 
threatens peoples’ traditional livelihoods. 
This approach refers to critical geopolitics 
including the following aspects: first, to take 
into consideration rapid climate change and 
long-range pollution which together with an 
increase in extractive industries create a real 
wicked problem in the Arctic; second, based 
on the COP 21 Paris Agreement and the 
related pressure to reduce CO2 emissions, 
freeze new investments in (offshore) oil 
and gas drilling (e.g. Shell’s decision to 
withdraw from the Beaufort Sea) and 
develop renewable energy resources in the 
Arctic; third, to (re)define who are relevant 
(international) actors and stakeholders in 
Arctic geopolitics and regional (resource) 
development, and in particular what is the 
position of the Arctic states and state-related 
actors there.
Controversial or not, those traditional 
factors of geopolitics - physical space, 
natural resources, technology and power 
of a state – are still present and relevant in 
the Arctic and Arctic geopolitics: The Arctic 
is a geographical region with a unique 
ecosystem, large marine nature and ice 
covered seas. The Arctic is (still) interpreted 
as a resource storehouse due to its rich 
natural resources, such as hydrocarbons 
and other minerals (USGS 2008), fishes and 
other marine animals, forests. Though it 
might sound as a cliché, this is the de facto 
reason for mass-scale utilization of resources, 
and that resource exploitation has been 
emphasized in the national strategies and 
policies of all Arctic states. Following from 
this, it is justified to argue that the resource 
models are still relevant and applied in 
the Arctic. The technology models are 
also relevant, though not emphasized in 
the national strategies. The heavy military 
structures, mostly nuclear weapon systems 
of Russia and the USA, are deployed in 
the region due to their global deterrence 
(Wezeman 2012), which is also a reason 
for no real nuclear disarmament, yet, in the 
Arctic.
Unlike, critical geopolitics recognizes several 
factors, and that there are several actors, 
which influence Arctic geopolitics. One of 
the new factors is an ‘actor’ per se, i.e. the 
fact that there are other actors as a/the ‘state’, 
people(s) and civil societies, and Indigenous 
peoples without their own state (Abele and 
Rodon 2007). The agent-based modeling 
emphasizes the importance of actors but 
forgets the importance of their interests, 
though actors always come with interests, 
and interests much deal with values. 
Indeed, the post-Cold War Arctic geopolitics 
is influenced by an increasingly dense 
network of transnational actors, including 
Indigenous peoples (organizations) 
energetically emphasizing their cultural 
and political identities and redefining 
sovereignty  (Inuit Declaration 2009), sub-
national governments in charge of regional 
development seeking collaboration both 
within and beyond national borders, NGOs 
with concerns and ambitions to shape the 
discourse, and academic communities 
producing knowledge, thus shaping our 
understanding of the region. 
Closely related with (Indigenous) peoples 
and civil societies (geographical) knowledge 
is a format of power, which is relevant, and 
should take into consideration (Moisio, 
2003). The more critical factor climate 
change, in particular its global nature, 
has become, the more important format 
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of power, or influence, knowledge on 
climate and the environment has become. 
Therefore, in Arctic research traditional or 
indigenous environmental knowledge (TEK) 
has already some time been recognized by 
Western science (Toyama Statement, 2016; 
Agreement of Science Cooperation, 2017). 
Following from this, power does not, any 
more, mean only ‘hard’ power, political or 
economic power and military force, and 
more importantly, there is influence, which 
can be transferred into power. Though 
the air is, every-now-and-then, full of mis- 
and disinformation, conspiracy theories, 
manipulation and falsification, and these 
are not only phenomena of the era of the 
internet and social media, power based on 
influence is more based on knowledge and 
communications. Finally, to have identity, 
knowledge and other immaterial values as 
geopolitical factors, as well as indigenous 
peoples as actors, there is a growing concern 
on a state (quality) of the environment 
and that of climate. As critical approaches 
of geopolitics, this means to politicize a 
physical space. Indeed, the post-Cold War 
Arctic is been highly politicized, though not 
re-militarized, by more soft and sophisticated 
ways than was the militarization in the Cold 
War.  
If in the 2nd WW geopolitics was misused, 
in the Arctic of the 2010s it is often 
misunderstood, in particular in media reports 
and also by policy-makers, and understood 
narrowly to mean traditional approach 
(classical) geopolitics. Fortunately, so far this 
has come with less harmful consequences 
causing mostly misinformation and 
confusion, though it has put the established 
international Arctic cooperation into a 
test. Actually, geopolitics influences, or 
the influence is seen in, the post-Cold 
War Arctic by several and different ways: 
from the presence of the nuclear weapon 
systems (as a legacy of classical geopolitics 
of the Cold War), and an emphasis on 
sovereignty by the littoral states of the 
Arctic Ocean (as a legacy of state and state 
power) to responses of non-state actors on 
a state of the environment (as an example of 
politicization of the Arctic region) and those 
of governments to new security threats (as 
an evidence of a shift in security premises) 
due to impacts of long-range pollution and 
global warming, as well as to growing global 
Table 2. Major Stages of Arctic Geopolitics
cold war’s geopolitics: transition period’s 
(1980s-1990s) geopolitics: 
post-cold war’s geopolitics: 
Dominated by militarization: 
the military (the nuclear 
weapon systems); 
technology, state hegemony 
and power game = 
mostly based on classical 
geopolitics.
Dominated by 
environmental degradation 
and transboundary 
cooperation: long-range 
pollution, nuclear accidents 
and growing concern 
on the environment; 
international cooperation 
on environmental 
protection and research; 
self-consciousness and 
circumpolar cooperation by 
Indigenous peoples = based 
on new and more critical 
approaches of geopolitics.
Dominated by climate 
change and hype of 
exploitation: pollution 
& rapid climate change 
(e.g. food safety); hype of 
mass-scale exploitation 
and increase of economic 
activities (‘geoeconomics’); 
importance of state 
sovereignty and energy 
security; high geopolitical 
stability and firm 
transboundary cooperation 
(exceptional); scientific and 
traditional knowledge (on 
climate and environment) 
as a new format of power = 
based on critical geopolitics 
and globalism.
interest towards, and influence in, the Arctic 
(as critical approaches of geopolitics). 
In contrast to traditional approach, a 
comprehensive description with holistic 
approach of the twenty-first century’s 
Arctic geopolitics includes comprehensive 
coverage of the approaches of both classical 
(Cold war) and critical (post-Cold war) 
geopolitics, i.e. “the history and identity of 
a ‘geopolitical’ Arctic and the contemporary 
triangle of Arctic geopolitics: rights, interests 
and responsibilities” (Raspotnik, 2016). For 
example, to (re)place the Arctic within the 
context of global multi-dimensional change, 
and explore worldwide implications would 
give a chance to define the global Arctic 
as a new geopolitical context. A state of 
Arctic geopolitics at the post-Cold War era 
is much with this kind of comprehensive 
approach including identities, rights and 
responsibilities, as well as (traditional) 
knowledge and stability-building (Heininen 
2016). 
concluSionS
At the early-21st century the Arctic region 
plays a key role in the global ecosystem and 
bio-geophysical processes that are heavily 
impacted by climate change and other 
global changes, and are closely integrated 
with current global economics and related 
energy security dynamics, as they relate to 
world politics. Long-range pollution was 
the first trigger, which caused a change in 
security premises and a paradigm shift, and 
made environmental protection as the first 
field of functional cooperation between the 
eight Arctic states. It was followed by the 
rapid warming of Arctic climate. These were 
wake-up calls to the Arctic states of growing 
concern on a state of the environment 
by non-state actors, such as indigenous 
peoples, (I)NGOs, scientists and scholars 
to start environmental cooperation. These 
were behind the first special feature of Arctic 
geopolitics from the point of view of critical 
approach of geopolitics. 
Followed from the functional cooperation 
for environmental protection by the Arctic 
states, there was a significant change in 
Arctic geopolitics from the confrontation 
of the Cold War period to transboundary 
cooperation at the 21st century. Due to this 
institutionalized Arctic cooperation there is 
high geopolitical stability and the region is 
neither overtly plagued by military conflicts 
nor disarmament, though the nuclear 
weapon systems of Russia and the USA 
are still been deployed there. International 
Arctic cooperation, under the auspices of 
the Arctic Council and between the Arctic 
states and the Arctic Council observer 
countries continues, so far, after passing a 
few tests of growing tension between Russia 
and the West, as well as the consequent 
sanctions and counter-sanctions. This 
exceptionalism is another special feature of 
Arctic geopolitics (from the point of view of 
critical approach of geopolitics).
Behind are on the one hand, common 
interests starting from the ultimate 
aim to decrease military tension and 
increase political stability using functional 
cooperation on environmental protection, 
due to pollution (in particular nuclear safety), 
and region-building as the main means. On 
the other hand, certain features of the Arctic 
were prerequisites for stability-building, such 
as the original global nature of the military, 
firm state sovereignty, high degree of legal 
certainty, and separation of certain issue 
areas, in particular that military-security, on 
the agenda of the Arctic Council. Followed 
from this, first conclusion of this article is 
that the high Arctic geopolitical stability 
is conscious and manmade (by the Arctic 
states). It also seems to be resilient, since it 
has passed a few tests, and big geopolitical 
changes, such as the self-governing status 
of Greenland, could be executed in a calm 
and peaceful manner with full agreement of 
a state and sub-national government. 
Another conclusion, as well as a scientific 
finding, is that based on the common 
interests and the preconditions there are 
certain (existing or emerging) features of 
Arctic geopolitics: First, that geopolitics 
and security are tightly connected with the 
environment, and second that geopolitics 
and security are been combined with each 
other in the Arctic context. The third feature 
of Arctic geopolitics is that the Arctic is 
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globalized. The final one is that the high 
geopolitical stability, as a common interest 
of the Arctic states and their joint efforts 
to maintain it, makes the globalized, stable 
Arctic region exceptional in world politics 
and IR. This can been interpreted as a 
potential asset to (re)formulate world politics 
of turbulent times and with ‘uncommon 
instability’ and IR. These special features can 
be interpreted as new themes, or trends, of 
the post-post Cold War’s Arctic geopolitics. 
When to interpret them as trends, there 
is an opportunity for a paradigm shift in 
approaches of geopolitics, if to aim to change 
the facts in order to reach the values, i.e. how 
to understand politics and power and make 
peaceful transformation to happen.
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